In this paper I offer a critique of the recent popular strategy of giving a contextualist account of vagueness. Such accounts maintain that truth-values of vague sentences can change with changes of context induced by confronting different entities (e.g. different pairs through a sorites series). I claim that appealing to context does not help in solving the sorites paradox, nor does it give us new insights into vagueness per se. Furthermore, the contextual variation to which the contextualist is committed is problematic in various ways. For example, it yields the consequence that much of our everyday (non-soritical) reasoning is fallacious, and it renders us ignorant of what we and others have said.
Contextualist accounts of vagueness
What is the relation between the vagueness of expressions and the way in which they are prone to contextual variation -for example, the vagueness of 'tall' and the way in which the people who count as tall can vary with context? A popular, straightforward response to this question has been to argue that the two phenomena need to be treated independently because, as Williamson summarises, 'vagueness remains even when the context is fixed ' (1994, p. 215) .
1 If we fix the context, we do not eliminate any of the characteristic features of a vague expression-within a single context, it still has borderline cases, apparently lacks a sharp boundary, and a sorites paradox can still be formulated with it. To illustrate the latter point: 'anyone one-hundredth of an inch shorter than a tall man is tall' is still compelling within a fixed context and can still be used to get from someone definitely tall in that context to someone definitely small.
Recently, however, the possibility of a treatment of vagueness that draws heavily upon contextual variation has come to seem like a live option.
2 By attending to more subtle considerations of types and sources before the change we judge them both as F and after the change we judge them both as, say, not-F. This results in 'back-tracking' (to use Shapiro's term): if we were taken the other way through the series after the change in classification, we would continue to call things not-F, even though we had previously declared them F. According to a contextualist, then, the extension of a vague predicate shifts as the subject goes through a sorites series in such a way that the sorites conditionals ('if x i is F, so is x i+1 ') are always true in the context of consideration. On one version, these shifts correspond to changes in the property expressed by the vague predicate and in the propositions expressed by the vague sentence in different contexts. On an 'interestrelative' account, on the other hand, the vague predicate expresses the same property through the series, but the property is an interest-relative one (see Fara 2000) . So, 'Jim is tall' can always mean 'Jim has significantly more height than is typical' , where what counts as 'significantly more' is relative to the subject. Since, allegedly, the interests of the subject change as they go through the series, the extension of 'tall' can change without any changes in the heights of the relevant people.
Among the tasks facing a theory of vagueness is determining the logic and semantics of vagueness. Now, it seems that simply considering matters of context will not settle what the correct logic and semantics are. Indeed, contextualist theories have been combined with a range of different logical systems, for example, Soames appeals to a three-valued logic, Shapiro uses supervaluationist logic and semantics, while Fara retains classical logic and semantics. The contextualist approach does not give us a new logic and semantics of vagueness and appears to be compatible with the logic and semantics offered by the standard (and less standard) theories of vagueness.
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This paper provides a critique of the contextualist approach to vagueness. 4 As a critic of that approach, I need not say that there is never any contextual variation in the extensions of vague predicates, and the truth-values of vague sentences, and I may even acknowledge that the contextualist has alerted us to previously unnoticed effects of, or types of, context-change. But I claim that appealing to context does not help in solving the sorites paradox, nor does it give us new insights into vagueness per se. Furthermore, the contextual variation to which the contextualist is committed is problematic in various ways. For example, it yields the consequence that much of our everyday (nonsoritical) reasoning is fallacious and that we are typically ignorant of what we and others have said. I conclude that we should abandon the contextualist approach to vagueness.
Some questions about sorites series and the sorites paradox
The contextualist's solution to the sorites paradox will depend on the chosen logic and semantics. For example, an epistemicist contextualist will maintain that the main premiss of the sorites is false because it has a false instance -even if there is variation with context over which instance is false-whereas with a three-valued theory, that premiss may come out as neither true nor false. A crucial aspect of solving a paradox, however, is explaining why a non-true premiss is so compelling, and this is where the appeal to context is hoped to help. A natural comment on the sorites premiss is that it is true because there is no sharp boundary to the offending predicate. So, the task of explaining the apparent lack of sharp boundaries is part of the same task. This is a psychological matter, rather than a matter of logic and semantics: it is a matter of explaining our attitudes to certain statements or propositions rather than their semantic status. But it may be that a particular semantic story-a contextualist account in this case-enables us to give the best, or the only reasonable answer to these important psychological questions.
There are a number of different, though closely related, questions here, among them the following. First, why are we inclined to believe of each consecutive pair in a sorites series for F that if one is F, so is the other (or that it is not the case that one of the pair is F and the other not F)? Second, why do we believe there is no sharp boundary to the F things? And, third, why do we find the main premiss of the sorites paradox so compelling? Since these are all pressing and relevant questions, we may hope that the contextualist story can provide an explanation that answers them all. 5 A crucial difference between the first question, on the one hand, and the second and third, on the other, is that the first demands an explanation of our attitudes to individual pairs and the others concern our attitude to generalizations (of which the sorites premiss is one). Explaining why we believe of each pair that ⌽ holds of that pair is not the same as explaining why we believe that ⌽ holds of every pair. For example, I might believe of each sentence in my book that it is true, but not believe that every sentence in my book is true.
The contextualist account seems more directly geared to answer questions about the status of, and our attitudes to individual pairs, rather than to generalizations. 6 For example, the contextualist may explain that when we consider a consecutive pair in the series, the context of considering such a pair guarantees that its two members are classified identically as regards to whether they are F, and this is what we believe about that pair. Even if the view is combined with classical logic and semantics, so that there is a sharp boundary somewhere in the series, the contextual variation guarantees that the boundary is not between the pair we are considering. To go on to answer the second and third questions-for example, why the main premiss of the sorites is so compelling-perhaps we infer from facts about the individual pairs to a generalization over those pairs stating that no boundary falls between them. Fara says 'it is no wonder that we were so inclined in the first place to regard the universal generalization as true, given that any instance of it we consider is in fact true at the time we consider it' (2000, p. 59).
Attitudes to individual pairs
Though the details of the above story can be elaborated in various different ways, I claim that the general strategy is flawed. In section 4 I examine the explanation of the plausibility of the sorites premiss, and the second stage of the explanation sketched above. First, I challenge the initial step-explaining our attitude to individual instances. If we are led through a sorites series, then the context changes as we go along, and for the contextualist's explanation to succeed, we need to accept that such changes have semantic import, in that they change the truthvalues of predications. For Fara, some of the work is done by a Similarity Constraint, which states, 'if two things are saliently similar, then it cannot be that one is in the extension of a vague predicate, or in its anti-extension, while the other is not' (Fara 2000, p. 57) . The absurd conclusion of the paradox does not follow from this principle, of course, since adjacent members of the sorites series will not always be saliently similar: as we go through the forced march, the pairs that are saliently similar will shift along with the focus of our attention.
For the explanation to work, the contextualist needs to say that we cannot hold the context constant when we go through a sorites series, even if we intend to hold it constant. For, we can, surely, face the series with the intention of keeping the context fixed and not altering the interpretation of the sorites predicate, and we will still change classification at some point.
7 Suppose I am going through the series and striving to say the same thing of each thing that I classify as F. It looks like I will have to fail, for as I survey different members of the series, the status of various items with respect to 'F' will change. With the more widely recognised cases of context-change, including but not limited to that associated with change in comparison class, we are typically able to prevent that change. For example, if we start talking about seven-year olds, I might say 'he is not tall; he might be tall for a seven-year old, but he is not tall' . The contextualist must be committed to context-change over which we have no such control. Such change is unavoidable and not only do we not know when the context has changed, but it can change when we believe it has not. This is an unappealing feature of the view, and in section 4 we will see how it has dramatic consequences for our reasoning. 
Do we believe the same thing of each pair?
Next, consider the following question. Does our subject believe the same thing of each pair, according to the contextualist, when she believes something reported by sentences such as 'it is not the case that one is F and the other is not-F' (or, perhaps, 'there is no F/not-F boundary between these two items')? This question poses a dilemma. Consider the first horn, where we answer 'no' .
Here, the contextualist may say that the beliefs about different pairs involve a different property-each, in different contexts, expressed by the predicate 'F'. To draw an analogy, when I believe that Adam is tall and that Bruno is tall -for a seven-year old and for an adult, respectively-then I do not believe the same thing about the two of them.
What, though, about beliefs about pairs the subject is not currently confronting, in particular beliefs that are not currently conscious? What is the content of Bob's belief about x 19 and x 20 when he is confronting x 26 and x 27 ? Is it retained in the form he acquired it in, thus involving the interpretation of 'F' relevant to the context in which he first faced that pair-call it F 19 ? 9
But, it does seem to me like I believe the same thing of all the pairs, just as I believe the corresponding generalization about them all. Recall the following quotation from Fara: 'it is no wonder that we were so inclined in the first place to regard the universal generalization as true, given that any instance of it we consider is in fact true at the time we consider it ' (2000, p. 59) . This is false. We do not believe all instances of any generalization, if we mean something different by 'F' in the various apparent instances.
Could the contextualist maintain that, in fact, at any given time we do believe the same thing of the different pairs? This is to take the other horn of the dilemma.
Suppose, again, that Bob has been going through a sorites series and is currently in the position of considering the pair x 26 and x 27 . 'F 26 ' is determined to be the relevant interpretation of 'F' in the context and Bob believes that it is not the case that one of the pair x 26 and x 27 is F 26 and the other is not. But, now, take an earlier pair in the series-say x 19 and x 20 -which Bob is not currently considering. On this horn of the dilemma, we must say that his belief about this pair is that it is not the case that one is F 26 and the other is not (for he believes the same of this pair as he does of x 26 and x 27 ). But, what when he goes on to consider the next pair? The context will then change, and the interpretation of F will shift to F 27 . The above argument could be replicated to show that what he believes of each pair now involves F 27 . It thus seems that his beliefs about all the pairs would change in content as the context and the extension of F change. Even if it seems as if he retains a belief about x 19 and x 20 , in fact, on this view, he initially acquires a belief about whether they are F 19 , subsequently has a belief about whether those things are F 26 at a later time, and has a belief about whether they are F 27 a little later again, when the context has changed.
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This unattractive proposal raises puzzling questions. I acquire a belief about a pair and at a later time have what is, in effect, a new belief about that pair. What could explain why I acquire this new belief (and why I cease to have the old one)? It is not acquired via confrontation with the pair. And how could confrontation with a different pair explain it?
Perhaps, instead, we count as believing the same thing of the different pairs, at least in some sense, just as we believe the same of two people at different times when we believe that they are of average height, though the relevant average is different. Perhaps 'same character but different content' is enough. This could be the response on Fara's interest-relative view: my interests change while it remains true that, say, x is F relative to my interests. Perhaps we assume we believe the same thing of each pair because we believe the same thing in this sense.
But, first, since there is still a sense in which the subject does not believe the same thing of each pair, puzzles about the content of unconscious beliefs remain. Second, the content shared by the various beliefs does not validate an inference to the generalization over them (just as the fact that two people are each average height in two different contexts, does not show that they are both average height in any context). I turn to problems with inferring the generalization in section 4 below.
In the next sub-section, I raise another problem that arises when, again, we are concerned with more than just the subject's current conscious beliefs.
Pairs in other contexts
According to the contextualist, I cannot identify the sharp boundary to vague 'F', because as soon as I come to consider a possible location of that boundary, the boundary ceases to be there. To draw an analogy, compare the situation with our unconscious beliefs. I cannot identify one of my unconscious beliefs, because as soon as I come to consider it, it will become conscious. Now, we do not go on to conclude that we have no unconscious beliefs, so why do we go on to conclude that there is no sharp boundary?
One disanalogy between the two cases might help us answer this question, but it also raises further unanswered questions for the contextualist. I can identify one of my past unconscious beliefs or report someone else's unconscious beliefs. For example, I can say that five minutes ago we both believed that elephants have trunks, but our beliefs were not conscious at that time. This gives me excellent reasons to think that I, now, have unconscious beliefs, even if I cannot identify them within the context in question. But, returning to the vagueness case, I cannot identify a sharp boundary to our vague predicates outside my current context any better than I can inside that context. On the one hand, this may appear to help the contextualist, by providing a disanalogy with the case of unconscious beliefs. On the other hand, it also suggests that there are further facts in need of explanation. Why are we unable to identify (and have no beliefs about the location of) the boundary to vague predicates in contexts other than the ones we are currently in?
Suppose I watch a video of Bob facing a sorites series and considering x 23 and x 24 . From outside his context I can say 'The sharp boundary in that context could not fall between those two items, because they were saliently similar to Bob' but I never feel in a position to go on ' … in fact the boundary was between x 31 and x 32 (which were not salient to Bob at the time)' . We can suppose that x 31 and x 32 do in fact straddle the boundary in Bob's context and that I, unlike Bob, am actually looking at those patches on the video. Bob and I are thus in different contexts and the boundary in my own context cannot fall between those items. But I will still come to the belief that the boundary in Bob's context is not between that pair either. Contextualists have not explained such a belief or other beliefs about contexts that are not our own.
So, this is where we are left from the discussion in section 3. The natural way to present the contextualist account is by concentrating on the subject's (conscious) classifications of and beliefs about a pair that they are actually being confronted with. When we ask about other pairs or other classifications-whether pairs considered earlier, ones the subject has not yet considered, or classifications in other contexts -matters become, at best, considerably more complex, and section 3 has explored some of those complications. But this problem also feeds into the issue about explaining our more general beliefs. For example, if our beliefs about individual pairs form at least part of our grounds for believing a generalization over those pairs (e.g. the main premiss of a sorites paradox), then it will surely be more than our conscious belief about the one pair in front of us that plays such a role. In the next section I turn to our beliefs in the relevant generalizations.
Generalizing from instances
Can the contextualist explain why we find the main premiss of the sorites paradox so compelling, and why we have other comparable general beliefs, as opposed to the particular beliefs about specific members, or pairs of members, in the series?
Now, once we are interested in our attitude to a single generalization such as 'Anyone one-hundredth of an inch shorter than a tall man is tall' or 'F has no sharp boundary' , it is not immediately clear how it can help to appeal to changes in context. Surely I can just consider that premiss in the abstract in a single context: it seems true, and no context shift can possibly be involved. This line of argument is a form of the original objection that maintained that we could isolate a single context and we will still face the sorites paradox. Now, contextualists will, of course, deny the truth of the inductive premiss of the sorites (appealing to whatever semantic account they are combining with their contextualism). And, although the appeal to context change may not seem relevant to explaining why it is so plausible, they are likely to maintain that our grounds for believing that premiss rest on consideration of its instances, and thus context change is indeed relevant.
Suppose we actually came to find a sorites premiss compelling because we faced the trial of a forced march series, assented to the instances, and were thereby drawn to the generalization. The contextualist's move from an explanation of our beliefs about individual cases to the explanation of our attitude to the generalization would then be relatively straightforward. Clearly, however, this is not how our attitudes to the generalizations typically originate. If asked why I believe an inductive premiss such as 'Anyone one-hundredth of an inch shorter than a tall man is tall' , I will not appeal to individual instances, but may call upon the meaning of 'tall' or some such. Perhaps I am wrong about my own reasons, but the burden of proof is surely with the contextualist to make this plausible.
But, even if we grant that some (perhaps unconscious) consideration of particular instances or of a forced march series constitutes our reason for believing the sorites premiss, we are committed to highly undesirable consequences. Let us consider how we are supposed to reason. We generalize from the truth of each instance of 'If Fx i then Fx i+1 ' (or the truth of every instance we have considered) to the truth of the cor-responding universal generalization. But it turns out, on the contextualist account, that the instances whose truth we grasp are not instances of the same thing: the predicate in question has a different extension in relation to different instances. We are not warranted in generalizing, for to do so would be to commit something akin to a fallacy of equivocation. 'For all i, if Fx i then Fx i+1 ' does not follow from the truth of something of the form 'If Fx i then Fx i + 1 ' for every i, if it takes something different to count as 'F' in relation to different instances. Now, the contextualist will reply at this point that we are indeed wrong to infer the universal generalization, and that this is a desirable consequence since, of course, that generalization cannot be true. But, accepting that our inferences are fallacious in this case commits us to admitting that many other instances of similar reasoning involving vague predicates are equally faulty, even when they do not yield paradox and seem free of problematic consequences. Since most of our expressions are vague and thus, according to the contextualist, have extensions that are constantly in flux, we will be unreliable when we attempt to use them in instances of, for example, universal generalization and induction.
Consider inductive reasoning. Suppose I observe a string of red postboxes and note that they are each red; the context changes with each observation and, since they are marginally different shades of red and different objects are salient alongside them, the standards required to count as 'red' will also change. When I go on to conclude that all postboxes are red, I do not mean the same thing by 'red' in the conclusion as I mean in all the instances, and so, again, I am guilty of equivocation. Moreover, I cannot guard against equivocation by deciding to keep the context fixed, since I do not have the power to keep it fixed through changes of what is in sight or in mind: these changes inevitably bring with them a change in context. (So, even in those cases where the change in context does not bring with it a change in standard, we cannot know that it does not, and will thereby not be in a position to trust those kinds of reasoning.) 11 Next, consider universal generalization, where we infer a generalization from the truth of an arbitrary instance. With the main premiss of the sorites paradox, the inference goes wrong because, in considering, ': neither instance gives us grounds to infer the sorites premiss (for any interpretation of F). But, the same complaint would arise if we were to infer the generalization 'Anyone one-hundredth of an inch taller than a tall man is also tall', which, to mirror the sorites premiss, we can express as 'For all i, if Fx i then Fx i-1 ' . Unlike the sorites premiss, this is true and unproblematic. But if I reason by universal generalization from an arbitrary instance, for example, 'If F 21 x 21 then F 21 x 20 ' , I will again be committing a fallacy, for, again, the interpretation of F will vary according to the instance chosen.
In general, if ⌽ contains the vague predicate F, then the premiss of an inference employing universal generalization will typically show that for some interpretation of F, ⌽(x) holds, but it may be a different interpretation of F for a different x, in which case we are not warranted in concluding that there is any interpretation of F for which the generalization ᭙x⌽(x) holds. It is not that the rule of universal generalization is fallacious as such, but that, if we cannot avoid changing contexts and so changing the interpretation of vague predicates between considering instances and considering the generalization, then we will not generally be in a position to apply the rule.
In short, the contextualist is committed to convicting most of our attempts at reasoning by universal generalization of the fallacy of equivocation. And the same will apply to most everyday inductive arguments. Whatever the explanation of our belief in the sorites premiss, these verdicts on forms of reasoning are unavoidable for the contextualist, yet, surely, highly undesirable.
There will also be related problems for the contextualist with indirect speech reports. 'S said that a is F' will almost never be strictly true. For the context of this report will be different from that in which S made the utterance, due to the different range of salient items; correspondingly, 'a is F' will express a different proposition in those two contexts. We will generally be lacking a way to report speech, and the indirect speech reports that we do make will almost always be inaccurate. This is unlike the situation arising from context-dependence due to changing comparison classes. For, here the reporter can specify or allude to the comparison class and thereby report the appropriate proposition. For example, Bob says, 'Adam is tall' , when the implicit comparison class is seven-year olds; if the comparison class changes to English adults, I cannot report, 'Bob said that Adam was tall', but I can accurately say, 'Bob said that Adam was tall for a seven-year old' . By contrast, accord-ing to the contextualist, the speaker and reporter do not have a grasp on how the differences in salient items changes the context, or the effects this has on what propositions are expressed. And there are no ways of pinning down the context from within another context in the way that specifying a comparison class allows us to do.
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In short, the contextualist is committed to extremely frequent changes in context about which we cannot know, but which result in changes of extensions of our predicates and truth-values of our sentences. 13 This results in our unreliability when it comes to the widespread instances of inferences or speech reports that require us either to keep context fixed or to be aware of how it has changed.
Grasping general principles
Let us return to the contextualist's explanation of our attitudes to generalizations such as the inductive premisses in sorites paradoxes or statements about the lack of sharp boundaries to particular vague predicates. Perhaps their explanation need not appeal to the explanation of our beliefs about the instances of the generalizations, in the way assumed in section 4 above. Perhaps they can find a more direct explanation of the plausibility of the sorites premiss. For example, we might find it compelling because we have grasped a true principle that seems to, but in fact does not, warrant belief in the sorites premiss. Fara's Similarity Constraint may play this role ('Whatever standard is in use for a vague expression, anything that is saliently similar, in the relevant respect, to something that meets the standard itself meets the standard'). The suggestion would be that we (perhaps implicitly) grasp this principle, and we conclude that the sorites premiss is true since it follows from the fact that if two things are relevantly similar then they are classified the same way. And the contextualist would continue by maintaining that the premiss does not actually follow, since adjacent members of the sorites series will not always be saliently similar.
But, if we properly grasped the principle and the role of variability in what is salient, we would, of course, understand that we were not licensed to infer the truth of the sorites inductive premiss. We would not feel the force of the paradox, or at least, would know or understand ized as F, we would surely deny that this was the principle guiding us. It is not strong enough, since we think that appropriate similarity between things not explicitly characterized either way is also highly relevant to whether one could count as F and the other not. Now, of course, we are not always good at stating the linguistic principles that we follow (e.g. grammatical rules), but if after careful considerations of a principle, we think it conflicts with our practices, then this is surely evidence that this is not the principle governing our classifications. At the least, the onus is on Soames to argue that it is (P*) that we grasp and follow.
More generally, if the explanation of our belief in generalizations such as the sorites premiss is to appeal to our grasp of a principle that the contextualist declares to be true, that principle must satisfy the following conditions. First, it must explain our attitude to individual cases (e.g. how we think that pairs of things that are relevantly similar and are presented to us together in a context must be classified the same way with respect to the vague predicate at issue). Second, it must not actually entail the sorites premiss. But third, it must be that we somehow fallaciously infer the sorites premiss from the principle we have grasped. Now, the principle must qualify the claim that for all pairs, our vague predicate applies either to both or to neither, for without such a qualification, the sorites premiss would follow. For example, this must hold merely for those pairs that are saliently similar, or those that we are currently confronting. But, we do not think that there is any such qualification. But then, surely it is more plausible to maintain that we (maybe falsely) believe the unrestricted generalization rather than the contextualist's restricted one, in which case we have no explanation of our belief in the sorites premiss that uses the contextualist's resources (we just have the assertion that we believe the generalization). For, what grounds are there for attributing to us a grasp of the restricted version? More generally, for the envisaged explanation to work, it would have to be the case that we grasp the principle that involves reference to context in some way, but we misunderstand what context consists in. Can we really be taken to have grasped the principle if we are so wrong about one of its central elements?
I conclude that in employing this strategy, the contextualist will not succeed in explaining our belief in the sorites premiss, or our belief that vague predicates do not have sharp boundaries, or other similar general beliefs involving vague predicates.
Conclusion
To warrant the adoption of any kind of contextualist account of vagueness, it is not enough to demonstrate ways in which vague expressions are typically context-dependent. It is not surprising or helpful to point out that the application of many vague predicates can vary with comparison class or with other related phenomena. For, this phenomenon is compatible with traditional non-contextualist accounts of vagueness, even if it is then down to the defender of such a view to show that such context-dependence is compatible with their theory.
To merit classification as a contextualist theory of vagueness, context must play a central role in providing illumination of the sorites paradox or the nature of borderline cases, etc. 15 In this paper I have argued that the appeal to context gives no new solution to the sorites paradox: it does not explain the status of nor the appealing nature of the main premiss, and it cannot explain our belief in the lack of sharp boundaries to vague terms or our attitudes to individual pairs in a sorites series.
I finish by returning to the original reason for not attempting to give an account of vagueness in terms of context variation: the apparent fact that if we fix the context, we still face the phenomena of vagueness, including the sorites paradox. 16 A number of my objections in the above discussion might be seen as ways of pursuing that initial thought in the face of more sophisticated treatments of context. For example, I have claimed that the appeal to change of context will not help when we are considering the sorites series all at once. And attempts to argue that our grounds for believing the sorites premiss involve context change will all fail. Similarly, I have stressed the problems with maintaining that the context cannot be kept fixed, even when we think it can and when we intend to make sure it remains fixed. In particular, this feature of the view plays havoc with our reasoning with vague expressions, 15 I have concentrated, above, on the sorites paradox, since this seems to be the most promising source of support for contextualist accounts. One claim that I have not pursued here is that a contextualist account of vagueness is needed to explain why we are permitted to go either way with a borderline F, classifying it either as F or as not-F. Shapiro calls this alleged phenomenon 'open texture' . In my 2003, (pp. 80-1), I argue that the claim that we can always go either way in such classifications is too strong and that sometimes there is a similar phenomenon among definite cases. 16 Fara responds to this point by arguing that not all context-dependence is variation with comparison class (pp. 55-6). For example, the objects in the immediate surroundings do not provide an implicit comparison class, she claims, but whether something counts as blue can depend on those nearby objects. But this does not succeed in responding to the point in question. For we can consider keeping all aspects of context fixed (e.g. the objects in the immediate surrounding): we need not limit ourselves to keeping the comparison class fixed.
